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Abstract
When focusing on rm's risk-aversion in industry equilibrium, the number of
rms may be either larger or smaller when comparing market equilibrium with and
without price uncertainty. In this paper, we introduce risk-averse rms under cost
uncertainty in a model of spatial dierentiation and show that the impact of un-
certainty will always increase the number of rms in an industry. This nding is
explained by the higher prices that rms charge to consumers under uncertainty.
With increased uncertainty, rms have greater incentive to enter the market since
they may benet from higher levels of pro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1 Introduction
When explaining variations in the number of rms across industries, standard arguments
drawing on scale economies and entry conditions usually neglect the issue of uncertainty.
Unfortunately, the prevalent assumption of risk-neutral rms is not really appropriate.
Several theoretical contributions have recently considered a setting where rms behave in
a risk-averse manner (see Asplund, 2002, and the references therein). Among the most
frequent explanations, one can invoke the presence of liquidity constraints, the manage-
ment by non-diversied owners or delegation of control to risk-averse supervisors, as well
as nancial distress (Drèze, 1987). In particular, the extent of corporate hedging activ-
ities may be interpreted as a reluctance to bear risk (Nance et alii, 1993). Clearly, the
introduction of uncertainty has strong implications for the product market competition.
The pioneering work dealing with the impact of uncertainty on rms' decisions is due
to Sandmo (1971). Within a partial equilibrium framework, greater price uncertainty
is expected to lower the optimal quantity produced in a perfectly competitive market
1
.
Then, the degree and distribution of price uncertainty are signicant factors to explain in-
dustry structure. At the equilibrium, Sandmo (1971) proves that an increased uncertainty
about price lowers the number of rms in the industry. A more general question is to
focus on the impact of risk aversion in a model in which the number of rms is determined
endogenously. Appelbaum and Katz (1986) were the rst to address that issue (see also
Haruna, 1996). Once a competitive equilibrium is introduced, they show that the eects
of price uncertainty on the number of rms in an industry can no longer be signed, even
with additional assumptions about relative or absolute risk aversion.
Despite the ambiguous prediction of price uncertainty on the industry equilibrium,
it seems tempting to believe that a negative relationship between uncertainty and the
number of rms is more likely
2
. Intuitively, and following the discussion in Sandmo
(1971), rms that are characterized by a high value for risk aversion certainly prefer not
to operate in a market where price uncertainty prevails. Indeed, uncertainty may be
seen as a natural barrier to entry, thereby leading to a decrease in the number of rms
1
See also Leland (1972) for the eect of uncertainty in a monopoly setting.
2
And such a negative relationship seems rather supported by the data. Using a cross-section of US
manufacturing industries, Ghosal (1996) shows that greater uncertainty exerts a negative impact on the
number of rms in an industry when correcting for endogeneity of the price uncertainty measure.
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in the industry. However, it is well known since the inuential paper of Oi (1961) that
variability may also oer opportunities for increasing average prot for risk-averse rms.
Average prots of a price taker are increasing in the variability of the output price and
Oi's conclusion does generalize to a considerable extent (Friberg and Martensen, 2000).
Such positive eects on prots could have a benecial inuence on the entry of rms.
In this paper, following Sandmo (1971) and Appelbaum and Katz (1986), we further
examine the eects of uncertainty within an industry equilibrium framework. We examine
the problem of free entry and exit of rms in a setting of spatial dierentiation with cost
uncertainty. Specically, we draw on the location model originally proposed by Salop
(1979), who introduces dierentiation using a circular city with consumers uniformly
distributed on its circumference. Our main result is to prove that the indeterminate
eect of uncertainty on the number of rms in an industry does no longer hold. In a
location model with horizontally dierentiated products and risk-averse rms, greater
cost uncertainty always increases the number of rms operating in the industry.
The intuition of that result is as follows. In a location model (either linear or spatial),
it is well known that the competitive price under product dierentiation is dened as
the sum of the marginal cost and the transportation cost, which leads to a monopoly
power for the dierent rms in the industry (see Tirole, 1988). When one introduces cost
uncertainty, the optimal price now includes an additional term corresponding to the risk
premium faced by the rms. So, when comparing market equilibrium with and without
uncertainty, it turns out that rms charge higher prices to consumers under uncertainty.
This leads to higher prots for risk-averse rms, and greater uncertainty increases the
number of rms in the industry. Thus, in a certain sense, our theoretical contribution is
close to the famous Oi's variability result.
By focusing on uncertainty in a location model, our paper is related to the recent
literature on risk-averse rms in an oligopoly. In a context of cost uncertainty, Wambach
(1999) proves that the Bertrand paradox such that two rms are sucient for perfect com-
petition does no longer hold with risk-averse rms. In an industry with price competition,
the equilibrium price is expected to exceed the competitive price and then increasing the
number of rms may lead to an increase in price
3
. Janssen and Rasmusen (2002) also
3
Specically, the new price is expected to be higher when there is an increase in the size of the market
3
consider a Bertrand model with uncertainty on the number of rms operating in the
industry. With an uncertain number of competitors, there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium in mixed strategy and again each rms charges a price larger than marginal
cost
4
. The question of strategic choices of risk-averse rms is further analyzed in Asplund
(2002), who examines how the degree of risk aversion and dierent types of uncertainty
aect competition in an oligopolistic framework. The key feature of this insightful con-
tribution is to propose a general competition model of risk-averse rms that encompasses
price competition with dierentiated products under various forms of cost and demand
uncertainty. In particular, competition is softer in case of marginal cost uncertainty.
Thus, our work may be seen as complementary to the analysis of Asplund (2002). Our
contribution is twofold. First, we focus on the consequences of uncertainty in a model
with product dierentiation and free entry of rms. Second, we present a welfare analysis
which accounts for the costs involved by rms in bearing risk. The remainder of the
paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we extend the circular location model of Salop
(1979) and assume that marginal cost is uncertain. In section 3, we determine the Nash
equilibrium in prices for any number of rms and show that rms charge higher prices to
consumers because of uncertainty. The Nash equilibrium in the entry game is analyzed
in section 4, with a positive impact of uncertainty on the number of rms. Section 5
examines the price equilibrium from a normative viewpoint. Concluding comments are in
section 6.
2 The spatial model
We consider a model with rms producing dierentiated products, in which consumers
are heterogeneous and where rms have uncertain marginal costs. Thus, we relax the
prevalent assumption behind the Bertrand paradox that rms produce an homogeneous
good, a situation analyzed by Janssen and Rasmusen (2002) and Wambach (1999) in an
uncertain setting. With a location model, it follows that rms can raise their price above
the marginal cost without losing their entire market share.
and the number of rms in the same proportion (see Wambach, 1999).
4
The perfectly competitive equilibrium is the limit case when the number of rms becomes large. As
the probability of competition increases, each rm reduces its prices.
4
We restrict our attention to horizontally dierentiated products, meaning that brands
are not uniformly ranked by all consumers. As usual in the literature, each consumer
has a dierent preference for the brands sold in the market due to dierent location.
In our setting, location corresponds to the physical location of a particular consumer.
Each agent observes the prices charged by all the rms, and then decides to purchase
the good from the rm at which the price plus the transportation cost is minimized.
Another convenient interpretation is that location can also represent a distance between
the brand characteristics viewed as ideal by the consumer and the characteristics of the
brand actually purchased
5
. Thus, rms choose their products anticipating that their
location decision in product space is expected to aect the intensity of price competition.
Our theoretical analysis of the impact of uncertainty on the number of rms draws on
the spatial dierentiation model originally described by Salop (1979), corresponding to
the case of a circular city. In so doing, we are able to examine the problem of rms' entry
on the market given marginal cost uncertainty. Specically, we study entry and location
decisions when there exist no barriers to entry other than xed costs.
We suppose that consumers are located uniformly on a circle C, which has a perimeter
equal to L. Clearly, the circumference L is a measure for the heterogeneity of consumers
and it may be seen as an indicator for demand intensity. Individuals are continuously and
uniformly distributed along this circumference. We assume without loss of generality that
the density is constant, and it is denoted by ∆6. Thus, the parameter ∆ expresses the
thickness of the market. Given the location of rms, consumers incur a transportation
cost equal to t per unit of length, such that this cost includes the value of time spent in
travel. Each consumer buys exactly one unit of the brand that minimizes the sum of the
price and the transportation cost. Nevertheless, this generalized cost has to remain lower
than the gross surplus that the consumer can obtain from the good. This outside option
is denoted by s. It is assumed to be large enough, so that the market is always covered
in equilibrium (goods are bought by all consumers).
Firms are located around the circle. Although the circular model of Salop (1979) is
a location model, it does not explicitly explain how rms choose their location (see the
5
In that case, distance is a measure of the disutility from consuming a less-than-ideal product.
6
Relaxing this assumption does not modify our theoretical conclusions. See Calvo-Armengol and
Zenou (2002) for the case of a general density in a model of dierentiated products, but under certainty.
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related discussion in Tirole, 1988, p. 285). Indeed, the spatial model has the following
two-stage structure. First, the number of rms is endogenously determined. It is assumed
that rms are automatically located at an equal distance from one another. Thus, if the
number of entering rms is denoted by n and given the circumference L, the distance
between any two rms is equal to L/n. Second, rms compete in prices given the previous
locations. So, a key feature of this horizontal dierentiation model is the focus on rms'
entry, and we examine the impact of uncertainty on entry.
There are many potential rms in the location model, which have all the same tech-
nology. To address the issue of entry, we suppose that each rm is characterized by a
xed cost of entry denoted by f . Once the rm is located at a point on the product space,
it faces a marginal cost c that is supposed to be constant. We depart from the model of
Salop (1979) by assuming that this marginal cost is uncertain, so that rms face supply-
induced cost uctuations in our setting. To formalize this type of uncertainty, we assume
that the marginal cost is described by a random variable c˜ whose mean is E(c˜) = c and
the corresponding variance is V ar(c˜) = σ2. As usual, greater cost uncertainty is measured
by an increase in the variance σ2 (a mean preserving spread in costs).
It seems important to note that our way to include uncertainty in the location model is
absolutely not restrictive. Indeed, there are numerous examples in the industry of sources
of uncertainty arising by the marginal cost of production. For instance, Wambach (1999,
p. 946) mentions the case of insurance corporations where the probability of accident is
imperfectly known to the insurers, rms which provide guarantees for new products (given
random breakdown), or simply rms which import brands and then face exchange-rate
uncertainty. Other explanations concern poor climatic conditions for rms that produce
or use agricultural goods or uncertain wages linked to eciency wage considerations and
shirking behaviors as well as uncertainty over the number of active workers (due to illness).
Each rm is labelled by subscript i (i = 1, . . . , n), and the rm's location is denoted by
xi. A rm is fully described by the list of prices charged on consumers (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn).
A consumer is located at the distance x ∈ C. Then, the generalized price to buy the
brand is equal to pi + t|x− xi| under linear transportation costs
7
. Firms anticipate that
7
While we restrict our attention to the case of linear transportation costs for the sake of simplicity,
our theoretical results remains unchanged with quadratic transportation costs.
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consumers choose to buy the brands to the rms which give them the lowest full price.
In the circular model, a representative rm has only two competitors. Given two level
of prices pi−1 and pi+1, the demand pool for the rm i is composed of two sub-segments.
The outside boundaries of the pool are given by two marginal consumers, respectively
denoted by x and x, for whom the generalized price is identical between two adjacent
rms : respectively between i− 1 and i for x, and between i and i+ 1 for x . Thus, the
marginal value x is the solution of the following equation :
pi + t(xi − x) = pi−1 + t(x− xi−1) (1)
Hence, the consumer which is indierent between purchasing the brand from rm i and
purchasing it from its closest neighbor i− 1 is characterized by :
x =
(pi − pi−1) + t(xi + xi−1)
2t
(2)
So, the rm i faces a demand from all the consumers whose location belong to the interval
[x; x], since the generalized price these consumers obtain from rm i is lower than the one
they would obtain from rm i−1. In a similar way, the marginal consumer x is such that
pi + t(x− xi) = pi+1 + t(xi+1 − x), which implies :
x =
(pi+1 − pi) + t(xi + xi+1)
2t
(3)
Finally, the demand pool for the rm i consists of all consumers whose location is com-
prised in the closed interval [x; x].
Now, let Πi be the prot level of the rm i. Knowing the rm's demand, the presence
of a xed cost and given the uncertainty on marginal cost, the prot for the rm is also
a random variable which is given by :
Π˜i =
∫ x
x
∆(pi − c˜)dx− f (4)
so that the random prot Π˜i can be expressed as :
Π˜i = ∆(pi − c˜)(x− x)− f (5)
Given the uncertain environment, we assume that rms are risk averse following some
recent extensions in oligopoly theory (see Asplund, 2002, Haruna, 1996, Mai et alii, 1993,
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Tessiotore, 1994, Wambach, 1999). Relaxing the standard assumption that rms are
risk-neutral has strong implications for the product market competition.
There are several reasons that may explain why rms behave in a risk-averse manner.
The existence of xed costs means that rms are making costly investment before pro-
ducing, so that risk aversion is driven by liquidity constraints (see Drèze, 1987). Many
rms have an imperfect access to the capital markets, and thus they have to bear part
of the risk associated with their production. Another reason deals with non-diversied
owners. Although owners may be tempted to maximize expected prots, the delegation
of control to managers in hierarchical structure favors the reluctance to bear risk since
the managers' income is clearly related to the rm's performance. Others arguments in
the prevalent literature are linked to costly nancial distress and to non-linear tax sys-
tems. Some studies have suggested that the extent of corporate hedging activities may be
interpreted as the result of risk-averse behavior (Nance et alii, 1993, Gézci et alii, 1997).
Given the uncertainty on the marginal cost, the rm i is characterized by a Von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function denoted by Ui, so that the objective function for
the rm may be expressed as :
maxVi = E[Ui(Π˜i)] (6)
where Ui is a continuous, twice-dierentiable and concave utility function (U
′
i > 0, U
′′
i <
0). From the denition of Π˜i, the representative rm i seeks to maximize the expected
utility function :
Vi = E
[
Ui
(
∆(pi − c˜)(x− x)− f
)]
(7)
Let us nally remind the denition of the monopolistic-competition equilibrium in the
circular city. At the optimum, each rm behaves as a monopoly on its brand, meaning
that the rm chooses the price that maximizes its utility function given the demand for
brand i and given that all other rms charge the same price, and then free entry of rms
results in zero prot. So, we solve the model by rst determining the Nash equilibrium
in prices for any number of rms, then by calculating the Nash equilibrium in the entry
game (see Salop, 1979, Tirole, 1988).
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3 The monopolistic-competition equilibrium
Let us assume that n rms have entered the market. Since these dierent rms are located
symmetrically around the circle, we examine an equilibrium in which each rm charges
the same price. We restrict our attention to the case of a covert market, which means that
there are enough rms in the market. This corresponds to a situation where the value of
the xed cost f is not too high.
Thus, the maximization program for the rm i is maxpi Vi, so that the corresponding
rst-order condition given by ∂Vi/∂pi = 0 under marginal cost uncertainty is :
E
[
U ′i(.)
(
∆(pi − c˜)
(
∂x
∂pi
−
∂x
∂pi
)
+∆(x− x)
)]
= 0 (8)
with U ′i(.) = U
′
i
(
∆(pi − c˜)(x− x)− f
)
for the notation. We also check that the second-
order condition ∂2Vi/∂p
2
i < 0 for a maximum is satised since :
E

U ′′i (.)
(
∆(pi − c˜)
(
∂x
∂pi
−
∂x
∂pi
)
+∆(x− x)
)2
+ 2∆
(
∂x
∂pi
−
∂x
∂pi
)
U ′i(.)

 < 0
using U ′′i (.) < 0 and ∂x/∂pi − ∂x/∂pi < 0. Since Πi is continuous in (pi−1, pi, pi+1) and
since Πi is strictly concave in pi, we deduce that there always exists a Nash equilibrium
in prices and that this Nash equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 1 The symmetric Nash equilibrium price denoted by p∗i is given by :
p∗i = c+
tL
n
+
cov[c˜, U ′i(∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
E[U ′i(∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
(9)
Proof : The optimal price is given by condition (8). First, we know that rms are
symmetrically located and thus the distance between two rms is L/n, so that the market
area for each rm is x−x = L/n. Second, given the denition of the marginal consumers
x and x, using (2) and (3) leads to ∂x/∂pi − ∂x/∂pi = −1/t. Thus, we get :
E
[
U ′i(.)∆
(
L
n
−
pi − c˜
t
)]
= 0
Given the properties of the expectancy operator, it follows that :
p∗i =
tL
n
+
E[c˜U ′i(∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
E[U ′i(∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
9
Since c˜ is an argument of U ′i(.), we can further simplify the optimal price using the fact
that E(XY ) = E(X)E(Y )+ cov(X, Y ) for two variables X and Y . Since the mean of the
random marginal cost is E(c˜) = c, we nally deduce (9). QED
Clearly, the sign of the covariance cov[c˜, U ′i(.)] is positive since Baron (1971) has shown
that the inequality cov[p˜, U ′i(.)] < 0 holds under price uncertainty and provided that the
marginal utility U ′i(.) is decreasing. Proposition 1 gives us a rst result concerning the
role of cost uncertainty on the spatial monopolistic-competition equilibrium. A greater
cost uncertainty when producing brands leads to higher generalized prices charged to
consumers. At the equilibrium, the price p∗i is the sum of three elements : the marginal
cost of production c, the transportation cost tL/n, which measures the monopsonistic
behavior of rms, and the risk premium given by cov[c˜, U ′i(.)]/E[U
′
i(.)].
As the optimal price stands, it seems at rst sight dicult to interpret the last term
dealing with risk aversion. To nd a more explicit result and get closed form solutions for
our problem, we have to make an additional assumption concerning the marginal cost.
Assumption 1 The marginal cost c˜ follows a Normal distribution, with E(c˜) = c and
V ar(c˜) = σ2.
Under assumption 1, we can use the Stein's lemma (Huang and Litzenberger, 1988). Let
us consider two variablesX and Y such that they are bivariate normally distributed. If the
function f(Y ) is continuously dierentiable, Rubinstein (1976) prove that cov[X, f(Y )] =
E[f ′(Y )]cov(X, Y ). Now, if we apply the lemma of Stein to our problem, it follows that :
cov[c˜, U ′i(∆(pi − c˜)L/n− f)] = E[U
′′
i (∆(pi − c˜)L/n− f)]cov[c˜,∆(pi − c˜)L/n− f ]
Since we have cov[c˜,∆(pi − c˜)L/n− f ] = −∆σ
2L/n, this implies :
cov[c˜, U ′(∆(pi − c˜)L/n− f)] = −E[U
′′
i (∆(pi − c˜)L/n− f)]
∆L
n
σ2
and thus the symmetric Nash equilibrium price may be expressed as
8
:
p∗i = c+
tL
n
−
E[U ′′i (∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
E[U ′i(∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
∆L
n
σ2 (10)
8
The derivation of the rst-order condition in the case of normally distributed uncertainty is also
derived in Asplund (2002) as a special case.
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Let us dene the parameter a such that :
a = −
E[U ′′i (∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
E[U ′i(∆(p
∗
i − c˜)L/n− f)]
In the literature, a is known as the Rubinstein's measure of absolute risk aversion9. Ru-
binstein (1973, 1976) has proved that this measure based on the expectations of U ′′i (.)
and U ′i(.) remains constant.
Proposition 2 Under assumption 1, the Nash symmetric price p∗i is given by:
p∗i = c+
tL
n
+
∆L
n
aσ2 (11)
Assumption 1 leads to a closed-form solution for the positive risk premium, which is
now equal to ∆Laσ2/n. It is an increasing function of the density ∆ of consumers on the
circle and of the demand intensity L, but it is negatively related to the number of rms
n. In that case, the risk due to uncertain marginal cost is spread over a larger number
of rms. A novel result in our analysis is that rms charge higher prices for consumers
given cost uncertainty. When rms are characterized by risk aversion (a>0), we obtain
∂p∗i /∂a = ∆Lσ
2/n > 0. Also, the optimal price is positively related to the variance σ2 of
the marginal cost since the derivative ∂p∗i /∂σ
2 = ∆La/n is positive. Both results indicate
that rms share with consumers the risk generated by cost uctuations. In industries
characterized by greater cost uncertainty, higher prices for brands are expected since the
risk premium increases.
Another interesting result is that the optimal price is an increasing function of the
demand intensity L and of the consumer density ∆ (only in an uncertain context), with
increased opportunities of dierentiation for rms. Other ndings concerning the variables
that aect the optimal price are more standard. With risk-averse rms in the industry
(a > 0), a larger product market exerts a positive eect on the equilibrium price, given
the higher possibility of dierentiation for rms (the market area for each rm is xed,
given by L/n). Each rm faces the same degree of uncertainty on its marginal cost and
9
Asplund (2002, appendix 1) also uses the measure −EU ′′i (Π˜i − f)/EU
′
i(Π˜i − f). The author denes
this ratio as the Arrow-Pratt measure of global absolute risk aversion. However, as pointed out by an
anonymous referee, this expression cannot be considered as the Arrow-Pratt measure which is given by
−U ′′i (Π˜i − f)/U
′
i(Π˜i − f).
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the risk premium is an increasing function of the density of consumers, which leads to a
higher price. Also, the optimal price increases with t since the market power of rms is
increased for consumers who are located close to the rms (Salop, 1979). Finally, given
the increased competition, we basically observe that the price decreases with the number
of rms in the market since ∂p∗i /∂n = −t/n
2 −∆Laσ2/n2 < 010.
Before nding the equilibrium number of brands (n is endogenous), we briey examine
the situation where rms are risk neutral. When cost uctuations have no impact on the
utility derived by the rms (a = 0), the optimal price is :
p∗i = c+
tL
n
which is the result obtained by Salop (1979) in a spatial model under certainty
11
. In
the case of risk neutrality, we note that the consumer density does not inuence the
equilibrium price. This conclusion does not longer hold when rms share with consumers
part of the risk generated by cost volatility, as shown below.
So, at this rst-stage of the location model, our main conclusion is that prices are
higher with cost uncertainty. The cost of an increase in uncertainty is supported by con-
sumers with dierentiated products. As a consequence, greater cost uncertainty increases
average prots for rms, and this positive eect of variability on rms' prot should be
linked to the inuential contribution of Oi (1961), who evidences a positive relationship
between the variability of the output price and average prots of a price taker.
4 Free entry of rms
We now turn to the determination of the endogenous number of rms n∗, assuming that
there are enough potential entrants to cover the market. Let us briey detail the condition
for the market to be covert
12
. We know that the equilibrium price has to be lower than the
gross surplus s. Since the maximum distance for a consumer is L/2n, the corresponding
10
The competitive outcome can be regarded as a limit case of our model when the number of rms
becomes very large.
11
In the original presentation of Salop(1979), the length of the circle is set to one.
12
On this issue of covert market in spatial model, see the further discussion of Jellal et alli (1998) in
the context of a labor market.
12
condition of positive surplus is :
p∗ +
tL
2n
≤ s (12)
Using the denition of p∗, it can also be expressed as :
aσ2
∆L
n
≤ (s− c)2 −
3
2
tL
n
(13)
so that the condition ensuring that the market is covered at the price equilibrium is :
0 < σ2 <
2n(s− c)2 − 3tL
2a∆L
(14)
Thus, the variance σ2 has to take intermediate values for each consumer to buy the brand
at the equilibrium. The interpretation of this result is as follows. When the variance σ2
is small, the equilibrium price is above the price under uncertainty, but the increase in
price remains limited since rms charge a low risk premium to the consumers. Hence,
the market is covert. Conversely, when the risk premium becomes important, the rms
are expected to set prices that are excessively high. Then, some consumers will no longer
purchase anything.
By denition, the equilibrium number of rms n∗ is given by :
E[Ui(Π˜i)] = 0 (15)
Ignoring assumption 1, let us suppose more generally that the uncertain cost c˜ is dis-
tributed according to a density function g(c˜) dened over the support Ω = [c; c]. Thus,
the previous condition may be expressed as
∫
Ω Ui[Π(c˜)]dg(c˜) = 0, the reservation prot
being normalized to 0. Again, the diculty for our problem is to nd an explicit solution
for the optimal number of rms n∗, which involves additional restrictions either on the
distribution of c˜ or on the functional form for U .
Recall that to derive the optimal price p∗i , we have used the Stein's lemma by assuming
that the marginal cost is normally distributed. It is well known that the mean and the
variance provide a complete characterization of a random variable which is normally
distributed. Thus, under assumption 1, we can rely on the mean-variance specication
for the utility function Ui
13
. Thus, the problem for a rm may be expressed as :
Vi = E(Π˜i)−
a
2
V ar(Π˜i)− f (16)
13
The mean-variance approach can be used if the stochastic distribution of the marginal cost belongs
to a particular parametrized family, normal or elliptical random variable.
13
where a is the degree of absolute risk aversion (a ≥ 0) and the prot is Π˜i = ∆(pi− c˜)(x−
x)− f . It follows that :
Vi = ∆(pi − c˜)(x− x)−
a
2
(∆(x− x))2σ2 − f (17)
One can easily check that with the mean-variance utility, the optimal symmetric price is
p∗i = c + tL/n + ∆Laσ
2/n as claimed in Proposition 2. Using this optimal value for p∗i ,
we nally obtain Vi such that :
Vi = t∆
(
L
n
)2
+
a
2
σ2∆2
(
L
n
)2
− f (18)
Since the number of rms n∗ is given by Vi(n
∗) = 0, we get
(
L
n
)2 (
t∆+ a
2
∆2σ2
)
= f .
Proposition 3 Under assumption 1 and with a mean-variance utility function, the opti-
mal number of rms n∗ in a situation of imperfect competition with free entry is :
n∗ =
√√√√(t∆+ a2∆2σ2)L2
f
(19)
Proposition 4 Under assumption 1 and with a mean-variance utility function, the opti-
mal price value p∗ under free entry is given by :
p∗ = c+
√
tf
∆
√√√√(1 + aσ2∆t )2
(1 + a
2
σ2∆
t
)
(20)
Now, let us dene φ(a, σ) such that :
φ(a, σ) =
1 + aσ2∆
t√
1 + a
2
σ2 ∆
t
Clearly, we have φ(a, σ) > 1, φ(0, σ) = 1 and φ(a, 0) = 1. Thus, the optimal price under
certainty p∗0 is simply p
∗
0 = c+
√
tf
∆
and we are now able to compare p∗0 and p
∗
.
Corollary 1 With free entry of rms, the price is higher under uncertainy.
In this model of spatial dierentiation, the main contribution of our paper is to formally
prove that greater uncertainty increases the number of rms in an industry. There are
14
more rms because of uncertainty and risk aversion
14
. Clearly, both the degree of risk
aversion a and the measure of variance σ2 exert a positive eect on the optimal number of
rms. That uncertainty positively aects free entry may be surprising, since it is usually
admitted that greater uncertainty is rather expected to decrease the number of rms in
an industry. For instance, in the context of price uncertainty, Sandmo (1971) argues that
rms characterized by a large value for risk aversion will choose not to enter in an industry
facing a high degree of uncertainty. Only low risk-averse rms are expected to enter in
industries with greater uncertainty, thereby reducing the number of rms.
Then, how can we justify that greater uncertainty does not act as a barrier to entry
under spatial competition ? In fact, we have previously shown that rms can charge a
higher price to consumers under marginal cost uncertainty, since they shift the risk to the
consumers. So, with greater uncertainty, the risk premium becomes larger and risk-averse
rms have greater incentives to enter the market since entering rms may benet from a
higher price. This positive relationship between entry and uncertainty under monopolistic
competition is a novel result with respect to the previous literature for models in which
the number of rms in the market is endogenously determined
15
.
5 Welfare analysis
We now consider the price equilibrium under uncertainty from a normative viewpoint. In
particular, we examine the impact of marginal cost uncertainty in a free-entry and exit
equilibrium in order to know whether uncertainty produces a larger or a smaller variety
of brands than the optimal variety level
16
.
With respect to the previous literature, we have to account for the additional cost
involved in bearing risk since the rms are risk-averse. From the denition of Vi such that
Vi = E(Π˜i)−
a
2
V ar(Π˜i)−f , we note that the term
a
2
V ar(Π˜i) indicates the risk supported
14
When the degree of risk aversion a is set to 0 (or σ2 = 0), we nd that the optimal number of rms
is n∗ =
√
t∆L2/f , which is the original result of Salop (1979).
15
Also, we observe that an increase in the xed cost value causes a decrease in the number of rms in
the market and that a rise in the transportation cost leads to an increase in the prot margin since there
is a higher probability of dierentiation for rms.
16
Under certainty, it is well known that private and social incentives do not necessarily coincide and
the market is expected to generate too many rms (see Tirole, 1988).
15
by each rm given the randomness of Π˜i. Using the denition of the prot level Π˜i, we
deduce that V ar(Π˜i) = ∆
2L2σ2/n2. Thus, the cost of risk bearing by a rm denoted by
Bi is given by :
Bi =
a
2
(
∆L
n
)2
σ2 (21)
We note that this cost increases with the absolute degree of risk aversion a, with the
demand intensity L and with the variance of the marginal cost σ2. Conversely, risk
bearing costs are a decreasing function of the number of rms n. The aggregate cost of
risk bearing is simply nBi.
In the spatial model of Salop (1979), the aggregate transportation cost T is :
T = 2nt
∫ L/2n
0
∆xdx (22)
since all consumers purchasing the brand from a rm are located between 0 and L/2n
units of distance from that rm. So, the average consumer has to travel L/4n units of
distance, which leads to the following aggregate transportation cost :
T =
t∆L2
4n
(23)
Now, the problem for the social planner is to minimize the sum of xed costs paid by
the producing rms, aggregate transportation costs and aggregate costs of risk bearing.
The social aggregate cost S is then equal to S = nf + T + nBi. Formally, the problem
for the social planner may be expressed as :
min
n
nf +
t∆L2
4n
+
a
2
(∆L)2
n
σ2 (24)
Proposition 5 Under cost uncertainty, the optimal number of rms nˆ chosen by an
omniscient planner is :
nˆ =
√
L2
f
(
t∆
4
+
a
2
σ2∆2
)
(25)
Proof. Since the problem for the social planner is minn S, we solve the corresponding
rst-order condition ∂S/∂n = 0 and obtain :
f −
1
nˆ2
(
t∆L2
4
+
a
2
σ2(∆L)2
)
= 0
which gives the optimal number of rms nˆ. QED
16
Corollary 2 The market generates too many rms at the equilibrium, i.e. nˆ < n∗.
When comparing the number of rms chosen by the social planner and the decentralized
equilibrium, it follows that :
nˆ < n∗ =
√
L2
f
(
t∆+
a
2
σ2∆2
)
(26)
So, in the free-entry location model, we note that the market generates too many rms at
the equilibrium. Clearly, too many brands are produced since rms have too much of an
incentive to enter. Of course, such a result also holds in the model of Salop (1979) under
certainty. But with respect to spatial dierentiation under certainty, we observe that the
social planner chooses a higher number of rms in order to achieve an optimal risk-sharing
among rms. Increasing the number of rms in the markets leads to an implicit hedging.
Finally, when the transportation cost is very low, we nd that n∗ is approximately equal
to nˆ. In that case, the number of rms only depends on costs involved in bearing risk,
and this factor which is equal to
a
2
σ2∆2 is identical in n∗ and nˆ17.
Since entry of rms is socially justied by the savings in transportation costs and costs
of risk bearing, we suggest that there are some policy solutions for the social planner in
order to reduce the excessive entry of rms in the market. In particular, any policy
designed to decrease the level of risk in industries may be an eective way to regulate the
market. Resources devoted to the pooling of industrial risks should signicantly contribute
to the decline of prices charged by the rms, by lessening the production risk premium
supported by consumers when buying the goods given spatial dierentiation.
6 Concluding comments
In this paper, we have analyzed a location model to examine the eects of uncertainty
in an industry equilibrium. We extend the model of spatial dierentiation proposed
by Salop (1979) by introducing marginal cost uncertainty and examine the free-entry
equilibrium. Accounting for horizontal product dierentiation strongly aects the eects
of uncertainty on the number of rms in an industry, which is indeterminate in a standard
17
When t→ 0, we get n∗ = nˆ =
√
a
2
σ2∆2L2
f
.
17
framework with homogeneous goods and price uncertainty (Appelbaum and Katz, 1986).
Our analysis is a contribution to the recent developments on the theory of oligopolistic
rms under uncertainty with dierentiated products presented in Asplund (2002).
In our setting, the optimal price charged to consumers includes an additional term
corresponding to a measure of the risk premium faced by risk-averse rms, so that the
cost of uncertainty is supported by consumers with dierentiation. As a consequence,
when there are no barriers to entry other than xed costs, rms have greater prots
opportunities and then incentives to enter the market are increased. Finally, comparing
the number of goods in a market economy and a social economy indicates that too many
brands are produced in a free-entry location model, cost uncertainty having an additional
positive impact on the distortion.
A nal comment deals with empirical testing. Our framework suggests a positive re-
lationship between cost uncertainty and entry of rms in industries with dierentiated
products. However, evidence on the eects of uncertainty on the industry equilibrium re-
mains scarce. Using a cross-section of American manufacturing industries, Ghosal (1996)
nds that greater price uncertainty has a signicant and large negative eect on the num-
ber of rms in an industry. Focusing on the intertemporal dynamics of industry structure
again for manufacturing rms in the United States, Ghosal (2002) shows that greater
uncertainty does not aect large establishments, while it has a negative impact on the
number of small rms in an industry (see also Ghosal and Loungani, 2000).
Nevertheless, this observed negative relationship between uncertainty and industry
equilibrium should not necessarily be interpreted against our model of spatial competi-
tion. For instance, Ghosal (1996) only includes a price uncertainty measure and does not
account for cost uncertainty. Asplund (2002) clearly shows that dierent types of uncer-
tainty may have opposite eects on competition for risk-averse rms in oligopolies. Also,
the issue of dierentiated products is not specically addressed in the previous empirical
literature. Thus, it would be useful to investigate the eects of uncertainty on the number
of rms for markets with dierentiated products and signicant cost uncertainty. Such
markets could be identied with uncertainty measures based on the standard deviations
of residuals in price equations for most important inputs. This empirical issue, which
could provide valuable information for public policy, is left for future research.
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